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Abstract—In recent years, the proliferation of so-called “fake
news” has caused much disruptions in society and weakened
the news ecosystem. Therefore, to mitigate such problems, re-
searchers have developed state-of-the-art (SOTA) models to auto-
detect fake news on social media using sophisticated data science
and machine learning techniques. In this work, then, we ask
“what if adversaries attempt to attack such detection models?”
and investigate related issues by (i) proposing a novel attack
scenario against fake news detectors, in which adversaries can
post malicious comments toward news articles to mislead SOTA
fake news detectors, and (ii) developing Malcom, an end-to-end
adversarial comment generation framework to achieve such an
attack. Through a comprehensive evaluation, we demonstrate
that about 94% and 93.5% of the time on average Malcom can
successfully mislead five of the latest neural detection models to
always output targeted real and fake news labels. Furthermore,
Malcom can also fool black box fake news detectors to always
output real news labels 90% of the time on average. We also com-
pare our attack model with four baselines across two real-world
datasets, not only on attack performance but also on generated
quality, coherency, transferability, and robustness. We release the
source code of Malcom at https://github.com/lethaiq/MALCOM1.
Index Terms—Fake News Detection, Malicious Comments,
Adversarial Examples
I. INTRODUCTION
Circulation of fake news, i.e., false or misleading pieces
of information, on social media is not only detrimental to
individuals’ knowledge but is also creating an erosion of
trust in society. Fake news has been promoted with deliberate
intention to widen political divides, to undermine citizens’
confidence in public figures, and even to create confusion
and doubts among communities [11]. Hence, any quantity of
fake news is intolerable and should be carefully examined and
combated [2]. Due to the high-stakes of fake news detection
in practice, therefore, tremendous efforts have been taken to
develop fake news detection models that can auto-detect fake
news with high accuracies [1], [4], [25], [27].Figure 1 (on
top) shows an example of a typical news article posted on
the social media channels such as Twitter and Facebook. A
fake news detection model then uses different features of
the article (e.g., headline and news content) and outputs a
prediction on whether such an article is real or fake. Further,
recent research has shown that users’ engagement (e.g., user
comments or replies) on public news channels on which these
articles are shared become a critical signal to flag questionable
1This work was in part supported by NSF awards #1742702, #1820609,
#1909702, #1915801, and #1934782
Fig. 1: A malicious comment generated by Malcom misleads
a neural fake news detector to predict real news as fake.
Real Comment: admitting im not going to read this (...)
Malcom: hes a conservative from a few months ago
Prediction Change: Real News −→ Fake News
news [25]. Hence, some of the state-of-the-art (SOTA) fake
news detection models [4], [24], [25], [27] have exploited
these user engagement features into their prediction models
with great successes.
Despite the good performances, the majority of SOTA
detectors are deep learning based, and thus become vulnerable
to the recent advancement in adversarial attacks [21]. As
suggested by [38], for instance, a careful manipulation of
the title or content of a news article can mislead the SOTA
detectors to predict fake news as real news and vice versa.
[12] also shows that hiding questionable content in an article
or replacing the source of fake news to that of real news
can also achieve the same effect. However, these existing
attack methods suffer from three key limitations: (i) unless
an attacker is also the publisher of fake news, she cannot
exercise post-publish attacks, i.e., once an article is published,
the attacker cannot change its title or content; (ii) an attacker
generates adversarial texts either by marginally tampering
certain words or characters using pre-defined templates (e.g.,
“hello” → “he11o”, “fake” → “f@ke” [20]), appending short
random phrases (e.g., “zoning tapping fiennes”) to the original
text [3], or flipping a vulnerable character or word (e.g.
“opposition” → “oBposition”) [5], all of which can be easily
detected by a careful examination with naked eyes; and (iii)
they largely focus on the vulnerabilities found in the title and
content, leaving social responses, i.e., comments and replies,
unexplored.
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Since many SOTA neural fake news detectors exploit users’
comments to improve fake news detection, this makes them
highly vulnerable from attacks via adversarial comments.
Figure 1 shows an example of such an attack. Before the
attack, a fake news detector correctly identifies a real article
as real. However, using a malicious comment as part of its
inputs, the same detector is misled to predict the article as fake
instead. Compared with manipulating news title or content,
an attack by adversarial comments have several advantages:
(i) accessibility: as it does not require an ownership over the
target article, an attacker can easily create a fake user profile
and post malicious comments on any social media news posts;
(ii) vulnerability: it is less vulnerable than attacking via an
article’s title or content, as the comments written by general
users often have a higher tolerance in their writing quality
(e.g., using more informal language, slang, or abbreviations is
acceptable in user comments) compared to that of an article’s
title or content. This makes any efforts to detect adversarial
comments more challenging. Despite these advantages, to our
best knowledge, there exist few studies on the vulnerability of
neural fake news detectors via malicious comments.
Therefore, in this paper, we formulate a novel problem of
adversarial comment generation to fool fake news detectors.
Generating adversarial comments is non-trivial because adver-
sarial comments that are misspelled or irrelevant to the news
can raise a red flag by a defense system and be filtered out
before it has a chance to fool fake news detector. Thus, we
are faced with two challenges: (i) how to generate adversarial
comments that can fool various cutting-edge fake news detec-
tors to predict target class?; and (ii) how to simultaneously
generate adversarial comments that are realistic and relevant
to the article’s content; In an attempt to solve these challenges,
we propose MALCOM, a novel framework that can generate
realistic and relevant comments in an end-to-end fashion to
attack fake news detection models, that works for both black
box and white box attacks. The main contributions are:
• This is the first work proposing an attack model against neu-
ral fake news detectors, in which adversaries can post ma-
licious comments toward news articles to mislead cutting-
edge fake news detectors.
• Different from prior adversarial literature, our work gen-
erates adversarial texts (e.g., comments, replies) with high
quality and relevancy at the sentence level in an end-to-end
fashion (instead of the manipulation at the character or word
level).
• Our model can fool five top-notch neural fake news detec-
tors to always output real news and fake news 94% and
93.5% of the time on average. Moreover, our model can
mislead black-box classifiers to always output real news
90% of the time on average.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Fake News Detection Models
In terms of computation, the majority of works focus on
developing machine learning (ML) based solutions to auto-
matically detect fake news. Feature wise, most models use
an article’s title, news content, its social responses (e.g., user
comments or replies) [27], relationships between subjects and
publishers [37] or any combinations of them [25]. Specifically,
social responses have been widely adopted and proven to
be strong predictive features for the accurate detection of
fake news [25], [27]. Architecture wise, most detectors use
recurrent neural network (RNN) [25], [27] or convolutional
neural network (CNN) [24] to encode either the news content
(i.e., article’s content or micro-blog posts) or the sequential
dependency among social comments and replies. Other com-
plex architecture includes the use of co-attention layers [30]
to model the interactions between an article’s content and its
social comments (e.g., dEFEND [27]) and the adoption of
variational auto-encoder to generate synthetic social responses
to support early fake news detection (e.g., TCNN-URG [24]).
B. Attacking Fake News Detectors
Even though there have been several works on general ad-
versarial attacks, very few addressed on the attack and defense
of fake news detectors. [38] argues that fake news models
purely based on natural language processing (NLP) features
are vulnerable to attacks caused by small fact distortions in
the article’s content. Thus, they propose to use a fact-based
knowledge graph curated from crowdsourcing to augment a
classifier. In a similar effort, [12] examines three possible
attacks to fake news detectors. They are hiding questionable
content, replacing features of fake news by that of real news,
and blocking the classifiers to collect more training samples.
The majority of proposed attacks leverage an article’s title,
content, or source. They assume that the attacker has a full
ownership over the fake news publication (thus can change
title or content). This, however, is not always the case. In this
paper, therefore, we assume a stricter attack scenario where the
attacker has no control over the article’s source or content,
particularly in the case where the attacker is different from
the fake news writer. Moreover, we also conjecture that the
attacker can be hired to either: (i) promote fake news as
real news and (ii) demote real news as fake news to create
confusion among the community [11]. To achieve this, instead
of focusing on attacking an article’s content or source, we
propose to generate and inject new malicious comments on
the article to fool fake news detectors.
C. Adversarial Text Generation
Text generation is notoriously a complex problem mainly
due to the discrete nature of text. Previous literature in text
generation include generating clickbaits [19], [29], text with
sentiment [13], user responses [24], and fake news [36].
Generating text under adversarial setting, i.e., to attack ML
classifiers, is more challenging [10]. Yet there have been
tireless efforts to construct adversarial samples to attack text-
based ML models [5], [20], [31]. Most of them focus on
making marginal modifications (e.g., addition, removal, re-
placement, etc.) in character [5], [20] or word level [5], [31]
of a span of text, either through a set of predefined templates
[20] or through a searching mechanism with constraints [5],
Fig. 2: Malcom Architecture.
[31]. Even though these methods have achieved some degree
of success, they are only designed for attacking static features
such as the title and content of an article. They are not
developed for dynamic sequential input like comments where
new text can be added over time. Adversarial text generated by
previous methods are usually misspelled (”f@ke” v.s. ”fake”,
”lo ve” v.s. ”love”) [20], or distorted from the original context
or meaning (e.g., [20], [5]). Hence, these attacks can easily
be filter-out by a robust word recognizer (e.g. [23]) or even
by manual visual examination. Because of this, we propose
an end-to-end framework to generate stealthy and context-
dependent adversarial comments that achieve a high attack
performance.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We propose to attack fake news detectors with three phrases.
Phrase I: identifying target articles to attack. Phrase II: gen-
erating malicious comments. Phrase III: appending generated
comments on the target articles. In this paper, we focus on the
phrase II of the attack, which is formally defined as follows.
Let f (·) be a target neural network fake news classifier. Denote
X = {xi, Ci}Ni=1, Y = {yi}Ni=1 as the features of articles and
their ground-truth labels (e.g., fake news or real news) of a
dataset D on which f (·) is trained, with N being the total
number of articles. Let xtitlei , x
content
i , Ci be the title, content,
and a list of all comments of xi, respectively. Then, we want
to train a generator G such that, given an unseen article
{x,C} 6∈ X and a target prediction label L∗, G generates a
set of M malicious comments Cadv to achieve the following
objectives:
Objective 1: High quality in writing and relevancy: Cadv
needs to mimic real comments both in writing quality and
relevancy to x’s content. This will prevent them from being
detected by a robust adversarial text defense system (e.g., [23],
[32]). Even though generating realistic comments [29] is not
the main goal of our paper, it is a necessary condition for
successful attacks in practice.
Objective 2: Successful attacks: This is the main objective
of the attacker. The attacker contaminates a set of an ar-
ticle’s existing comments C by appending Cadv such that
f : x,C∗ 7→ L∗, where C∗ ←− C ⊕ Cadv with ⊕ denoting
concatenating, and L∗ is the target prediction label. When
L∗ ← 0, Cadv ensures that, after posted, an article x will
not be detected by f as fake (and not to be removed from
the news channels). When L∗ ← 1, Cadv helps demote real
news as fake news (and be removed from the news channels).
There are two types of attacks: (i) white box and (ii) black
box attack. In a white box attack, we assume that the attacker
has access to the parameters of f . In a black box attack, on the
other hand, the f ’s architecture and parameters are unknown
to adversaries. This leads to the next objective below.
Objective 3: Transferability: Cadv needs to be transferable
across different fake news detectors. In a black box setting,
the attacker uses a surrogate white box fake news classifier f ∗
to generate Cadv and transfer Cadv to attack other black box
models f . Since fake news detectors are high-stack models, we
impose a stricter assumption compared to previous literature
(e.g., [20]) where public APIs to target fake news classifiers
are inaccessible. In practice, the training dataset of an unseen
black box model will be different from that of a white box
model, yet they can be highly overlapped. Since fake news
with reliable labels are scarce and usually encouraged to be
publicized to educate the general public (e.g., via fact-check
sites), fake news defenders have incentives to include those
in the training dataset to improve the performance of their
detection models. To simplify this, we assume that both white
box and black box models share the same training dataset.
IV. ADVERSARIAL COMMENTS GENERATION
In this paper, we propose MALCOM, an end-to-end
Malicious Comment Generation Framework, to attack fake
news detection models. Figure 2 depicts the Malcom frame-
work. Given an article, Malcom generates a set of malicious
comments using a conditional text generator G. We train G
together with STYLE and ATTACK modules. While the STYLE
module gradually improves the writing styles and relevancy of
the generated comments, the ATTACK module ensures to fool
the target classifier.
A. Conditional Comment Generator: G
G(x, z) is a conditional sequential text generation model
that generates malicious comment c∗ by sampling one token
at a time, conditioned on (i) previously generated words, (ii)
article x, and (iii) a random latent variable z. Each token
is sequentially sampled according to conditional probability
function:
p(c∗|x; θG) =
T∏
t=1
p(c∗t |c∗t−1, c∗t−2, . . . , c∗1;x; z) (1)
where c∗t is a token sampled at time-step t, T is the maximum
generated sequence length, and θG is the parameters of G to
be learned. G can also be considered as a conditional language
model, and can be trained using MLE with the teacher-forcing
[18] by maximizing the negative log-likelihood (NLL) for all
comments conditioned on the respective articles in X . We want
to optimize the objective function:
min
θG
LMLEG = −
N∑
i=1
ci log p(c
∗
i |xi; θG) (2)
B. Style Module
Both writing style and topic coherency are crucial for a
successful attack. Due to its high-stake, a fake news detector
can be self-guarded by a robust system where misspelled
comments or ones that are off-topic from the article’s content
can be flagged and deleted. To overcome this, we introduce the
STYLE module to fine-tune G such that it generates comments
with (i) high quality in writing and (ii) high coherency to an
article’s content.
First, we utilize the GAN [8] and employ a comment style
discriminator D to co-train with G in an adversarial training
schema. We use Relativistic GAN (RSGAN) [15] instead of
standard GAN loss [8]. In RSGAN, the generator G aims to
generate realistic comments to fool a discriminator D, while
the discriminator D aims to discriminate whether the comment
c is more realistic than randomly sampled fake data generated
by G. Specifically, we alternately optimize D and G with the
following two objective functions:
min
θG
LDG = −E(x,c)∼pD(X );z∼pz [log(σ(D(c)−D(G(x, z)))]
min
θD
LD = −E(x,c)∼pD(X );z∼pz [log(σ(D(G(x, z))−D(c)))]
(3)
where σ is a sigmoid function, θG is the parameters of G and
θD is the parameters of D. By using D, we want to generate
comments that are free from misspellings while resembling
realistic commenting styles.
Second, to enhance the relevancy between the generated
comments and the article, we minimize the mutual information
gap between comments generated by G and the article’s titles.
Specifically, we use maximum mean discrepancy (MMD),
which has been shown to be effective in enforcing mutual
information. The loss function can be written as:
min
θG
LHG =MMD(X title, G(X ))
=
[
Ex,x′∼pD(X )k(x
title,x′ title)
+ Ex∼pD(X );c∗,c∗′∼G(x,z)k(c
∗, c∗
′
)
− 2Ex∼pD(X ),c∗∼G(x,z)k(xtitle, c∗)
] 1
2
(4)
where the MMD compares the distribution X title of real
articles’ titles and that of generated comments G(X ) by
projecting them into Hilbert spaces (RKHS) using a Gaussian
kernel k. Intuitively, we want to minimize the information gap
between the real titles and the generated comments. Moreover,
we use xtitle (i.e., the title of x) instead of xcontent (i.e., the
content of x) because: (i) an article’s content is usually much
longer, hence requiring more computation, (ii) an article’s title
is a summary of the article’s content, and (iii) prior studies
(e.g., [6]) show that social media users actually rely more on
the headlines rather than the actual content for commenting,
sharing, and liking.
C. Attack Module
This module guides G to generate comments that can fool
the target classifier. In a white box setting, the fake news
classifier can be directly used to guide the learning of G. In a
Algorithm 1 Generating Adversarial Comments Algorithm
1: Pre-train G with teacher-forcing and MLE using Eq. (2) with train set.
2: Pre-train a surrogate fake news classifier f using Eq. (IV-C) with train
set.
3: repeat
4: Training G with D using Eq. (3) in mini-batch from train set.
5: Training G using Eq. (4) in mini-batch from train set.
6: Training G with f using Eq. (5) in mini-batch from train set.
7: until convergence
black box setting, a surrogate fake news classifier can be used
to generate and transfer malicious comments to unseen fake
news detectors. We denote f (xi,Ci) parameterized by θf as
the surrogate white box classifier, predicting whether or not
xi is fake news. f can be trained using binary-cross-entropy
loss over D as:
min
θf
Lf = − 1
N
N∑
i
(yilog(f (xi, Ci)))+(1−yi)log(1−f (xi, Ci))
To use this trained model f to guide G, we use signals back-
propagated from f to force G to generate a new comment c∗
such that f (xi, C∗i ) (where C
∗
i ←− Ci⊕{c∗}) outputs a target
prediction label L∗ ∈ {0, 1} for the article xi. Specifically, we
want to optimize the objective function:
min
θG
Lf(L∗)G = −
1
N
N∑
i
(L∗log(f (xi, C
∗
i )))+(1−L∗)log(1−f (xi, C∗i ))
(5)
One obvious attack scenario is for an attacker to promote fake
news, i.e., to generate comments to mislead the target classifier
to classify fake news as real news (L∗ ←− 0). Adversely, an
attacker might also want to fool the target classifier to classify
real news as fake news (L∗ ←− 1).
D. Objective Function of Malcom
At the end, an attacker aims to generate realistic and relevant
comments to attack a target fake news classifier by optimizing
objective functions as follows.
min
θf
Lf ; min
θD
LD; min
θG
(LMLEG +LDG+LHG+Lf(L
∗)
G ) (6)
where each term in Eq. (6) equally contributes to the final loss
function. We use Adam [7] to optimize the objective functions
with a mini-batch training approach. Alg. 1 shows the overall
training algorithm.
E. Implementation Details
Training with Discrete Data: We need to back-propagate the
gradients of the loss in Eq. (3, 4, 5) through discrete tokens
sampled by G from the multinomial distribution c∗t at each
time-step t. Since this sampling process is not differentiable,
we employ Gumbell-Softmax [14] relaxation trick with a τ
parameter (i.e., generation temperature) to overcome this. We
refer interested readers on the elaborate discussion of the
Gumbell-Softmax technique and the effects of τ on generation
quality and diversity to [14], [33].
Generation Strategy: For each article x, we generate new
comment c ←− G(x, z) where z ∼ N (0, 1). To minimize
TABLE I: Dataset Statistics and Details of Target Classifiers and
Their Fake News Detection Performance
Dataset #articles #comments #fake #real
GOSSIPCOP 4,792 116,308 1,894 2,898
PHEME 5,476 52,612 1,980 3,486
Classifier GOSSIPCOP PHEMEAccuracy F1 Accuracy F1
fCNN 0.74 0.74 0.77 0.77
fRNN 0.70 0.69 0.71 0.71
CSI\t [25] 0.65 0.70 0.61 0.61
TEXTCNN [16] 0.68 0.68 0.76 0.76
dEFEND [27] 0.76 0.76 0.78 0.78
the risk of being detected by a defender, an attacker desires
to select the best set of comments to attack, especially those
that are highly relevant to the target article. Hence, for each
article x, we sample different z to generate different malicious
comments and select c that is the most coherent to the
article. To measure such the coherency, we derive function
Tk(c,x
title) which will be introduced in Sec. (V-A5).
Architectures and Parameters Setting: We employ Rela-
tional Memory Recurrent Network (LMRN) [26], [33] and
multi discriminative representations (MDR) [33] as the corner-
stone of G and D architecture. We also observe that D with
a CNN-based architecture works very well in our case. The
LMRN model is adapted from the SONNET model2. The MDR
implementation is publicly available 3. We will release all
datasets, codes, and parameters used in our experiments upon
the acceptance of this paper.
V. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of Malcom
and try to answer the following analytical questions (AQs):
AQ1 Quality, Diversity, and Coherency: How realistic are the
generated comments in terms of their writing styles and
as well as coherency to the original articles’ contents?
AQ2 Attack Performance: How effective are generated com-
ments in attacking white box and black box detectors?
AQ3 Attack Robust Fake News Detectors: How effective
are generated comments in attacking fake news detectors
safe-guarded by a robust comments filtering feature?
AQ4 Robustness: How many malicious comments do we need
and how early can they effectively attack the detectors?
We plan to release all datasets, codes, and parameters used
in our experiments (upon the acceptance of this paper).
A. Experimental Set-Up
1) Datasets: We experiment with two popular public
benchmark datasets, i.e., GOSSIPCOP [28] and PHEME [17].
GOSSIPCOP is a dataset of fake and real news collected from
a fact-checking website, GossipCop, whereas PHEME is a
dataset of rumors and non-rumors relating to nine different
breaking events. These datasets are selected because they
include both veracity label and relevant social media discourse
content on Twitter4.
2https://github.com/deepmind/sonnet
3https://github.com/williamSYSU/TextGAN-PyTorch
4We exclude another popular dataset, POLITIFACT, also from [28] because
it is much smaller and less diverse in terms of topics
2) Data Processing and Partitioning: For each dataset,
we first clean all of the comments (e.g., remove mentions,
hashtags, URLs, etc.). We also remove non-English comments,
and we only select comments that have length from 5 and 20.
We split the original dataset into train and test set with a split
ratio of 9:1. Since PHEME dataset does not include articles’
contents, we use their titles as alternatives. Table I shows the
statistics of the post-processed datasets. We use the train set
to train both G and target fake news classifiers f . All the
experiments are done only on the test set, i.e., we evaluate
quality and attack performance of generated comments on
unseen articles and their ground-truth comments.
3) Target Classifier: . We experiment Malcom with SOTA
and representative fake news classifiers, which are summarized
in Table I. Note that both datasets are challenging ones as
SOTA methods can only achieve 0.76 and 0.78 in F1 using
the first 10 comments of each article. These classifiers are
selected because they cover a variety of neural architectures to
learn representations of each article and its comments, which
is eventually input to a softmax layer for prediction. In all of
the following classifiers, we encode the article’s content into
a feature vector of R512 by using Universal Sentence Encoder
(USE) [3], followed by a fully-connected-network (FCN) layer.
• fCNN : This classifier uses CNN layers to encode each
comment into a vector. Then, it concatenates the average of
all encoded comments with the feature vector of the article’s
content as the article’s final representation.
• fRNN : This classifier uses a RNN layer to model the se-
quential dependency among its comments, output of which
is then concatenated with the vectorized form of the article’s
content as the article’s final representation. We utilize Gated
Recurrent Unit (GRU) as the RNN architecture because it
has been widely adopted in previous fake news detection
literatures (e.g., [25], [27]).
• TEXTCNN [16]: TEXTCNN uses a CNN architecture to
encode the mean of vector representations of all of its
comments. The output vector is then concatenated with the
article’s content vector as the article’s final representation.
• CSI\t [25]: CSI uses GRU to model the sequential depen-
dency of textual features of user comments and the network
features among users participating in an article’s discourse
to detect fake news. Different from fRNN , this model does
not use an article’s content as an input. We use a modified
version, denoted as CSI\t, that does not use the network
features as such information is not available in both datasets.
• dEFEND [27]: Given an article, this algorithm utilizes a
co-attention layer between an article’s content and com-
ments as input to make a final prediction.
Other methods are surveyed but not included in the exper-
iments because: (i) overall, their accuracies were reported
inferior to those of dEFEND, CSI, (ii) SAME [4] only uses
extracted sentiments of the comments, not the whole text as
input, (iii) FAKEDETECTOR [37] mainly uses graph-based
features, which is not within our scope of study, and (iv)
TCNN-URG [24] focuses only on early fake news detection.
TABLE II: Comparison among Attack Methods
Method end-to-end generalization levelgeneration via learning of attack
COPYCAT # # sentence
HOTFLIP # # character/word
UNITRIGGER #  multi-level
TEXTBUGGER # # character/word
Malcom   sentence
TABLE III: Examples of Generated Malicious Comment. Spans in
purple and italics are retrieved from the train set and carefully
crafted. Spans in blue are generated in end-to-end fashion.
Title why hollywood won’t cast renee zellweger anymore
Content so exactly what led rene zellweger, an oscar (...)
COPYCAT her dad gave her a great smile
+HOTFLIP her dad gave got her a great smile
+UNITRIGGER edit season edit her dad gave her a great smile
+TEXTBUGGER her dad gave ga ve her a great smile
Malcom why do we need to ruin this season
4) Compared Attack Methods: We compared Malcom with
representative and SOTA adversarial text generators (Table II).
• COPYCAT Attack: We created this method as a trivial
attack baseline. COPYCAT randomly retrieves a comment
from a relevant article in the train set which has the target
label. We use USE to facilitate semantic comparison among
articles’ contents.
• HOTFLIP Attack [5]: This attack finds the most critical
word in a sentence and replaces it with a similar one to
fool the target classifier. Since HOTFLIP does not generate
a whole sentence but make modifications on an existing
one, we first use the comment retrieved by COPYCAT as
the initial malicious comment.
• Universal Trigger (UNITRIGGER) Attack [3]5: It searches
and appends a fixed and universal phrase to the end of an
existing sentence to fool a text classifier. In this case, we
want to find an universal topic-dependent prefix to prepend
to every comment retrieved by COPYCAT to attack. For
a fair comparison and to ensure the coherency with the
target article’s content, we restrict replacement candidates
to the top q=30 words (for GOSSIPCOP dataset) and q=30
words (for PHEME dataset) representing the article’s topic.
q is chosen such that replacement candidates are distinctive
enough among different topics. These words and topics are
retrieved from a topic modeling function LDAk(·).
• TEXTBUGGER Attack [20]: This method generates “bugs”,
i.e., carefully crafted tokens, to replace words of a sentence
to fool text classifiers. This attack also requires an existing
comment to attack. Therefore, we first use COPYCAT to
retrieve an initial text to attack. Next, we search for “bugs”
using one of the following strategies insert, delete, swap,
substitute-c, substitute-w as described in [20] to replace one
of the words in a comment that achieves the attack goal.
5) Evaluation Measures:
1) Success Attack Rate (Atk%): This quantifies the effec-
tiveness of the attack. For example, a target-real attack on
f with Atk% score of 80% indicates that an attacker can
fool f to predict real-news 80% of the time on all news
articles that F should have otherwise predicted correctly.
5 https://github.com/Eric-Wallace/universal-triggers
TABLE IV: Quality, Diversity, Coherency and White Box Attack
Model GOSSIPCOP Dataset↑Quality ↓Diversity ↑Coherency ↑Atk%
COPYCAT 0.650 - 0.585 0.497
+HOTFLIP 0.618 - 0.565 0.803
+UNITRIGGER 0.545 - 0.725 0.929
+TEXTBUGGER 0.643 - 0.561 0.749
MALCOM\STYLE 0.740 2.639 0.659 0.986
MALCOM 0.759 2.520 0.730 0.981
Model PHEME Dataset↑Quality ↓Diversity ↑Coherency ↑Atk
COPYCAT 0.697 - 0.578 0.784
+HOTFLIP 0.657 - 0.530 0.958
+UNITRIGGER 0.608 - 0.595 0.951
+TEXTBUGGER 0.617 - 0.528 0.975
MALCOM\STYLE 0.517 2.399 0.732 1.000
MALCOM 0.776 1.917 0.812 0.966
”-”: NLLgen cannot be computed for retrieval-based method
All experiments are averaged across 3 different runs
2) Quality and Diversity: We use BLEU and negative-log-
likelihood loss (NLL gen) scores to evaluate how well
generated comments are in terms of both quality and di-
versity, both of which are widely adopted by previous text
generation literature (e.g., [10], [33], [34]). While BLEU
scores depict the quality of the generated text compared with
an out-of-sample test set of human-written sentences (the
higher the better), NLL gen signals how diverse generated
sentences are (the lower the better).
3) Topic Coherency: We derive a topic coherency score of
a set of arbitrary comments C and its respective set of
articles X of size N as follows: Tk(X,C) = 1N
∑N
i=0[1−
cos(LDAk(x
content
i ), LDAk(ci))], where cos(·) is a co-
sine similarity function. LDAk(·) is a Latent Dirichlet
Allocation (LDA) model that returns the distribution of
k different topics of a piece of text. We train LDAk on
all of the articles’ contents using unsupervised learning
with hyper-parameter k. The larger the score is, the more
topic-coherent the comment gets to the article. Because
different comments generation algorithms work well with
different values of k, for a fair comparison, we report the
averaged topic coherency across different values of k as
the final Coherency score: Coherency =
∑
k∈K Tk(X,C).
We select k ∈ K such that the averaged entropy of topic
assignment of each article is minimized, i.e., to ensure that
the topic assigned to each article is distinctive enough to
have meaningful evaluation.
B. AQ1. Quality, Diversity and Coherency
Tables III and IV show the examples of the generated
comments by all attacks and their evaluation results on the
quality, diversity, and topic coherency. Malcom generates
comments with high quality in writing and topic coherency.
However, we do not discount the quality of human-written
comments. The reason why BLEU scores of real comments,
i.e., COPYCAT, are lower than that of MALCOM is because
they use a more diverse vocabulary and hence reduce n-gram
matching chances with reference text in the test set. The user-
study in Sec. VI-A will later show that it is also not trivial to
differentiate between MALCOM-generated and human-written
comments even for human users.
TABLE V: Black Box Attack Performance on Different Attack Strategies and Target Classifier Architectures (Atk%)
Attack/Model GOSSIPCOP Dataset PHEME Dataset
f ∗RNN fRNN fCNN CSI\t TEXTCNN dEFEND f ∗RNN fRNN fCNN CSI\t TEXTCNN dEFEND
BASELINE 0.416 0.509 0.499 0.516 0.548 0.652 0.533 0.514 0.498 0.606 0.537 0.543
COPYCAT 0.497 0.689 0.688 0.670 0.774 0.802 0.784 0.783 0.766 0.821 0.716 0.644
+HOTFLIP 0.803 0.813 0.765 0.820 0.838 0.866 0.958 0.850 0.845 0.879 0.811 0.711
+UNITRIGGER 0.929 0.763 0.722 0.803 0.745 0.817 0.951 0.783 0.782 0.783 0.781 0.730
+TEXTBUGGER 0.749 0.736 0.742 0.742 0.784 0.832 0.975 0.832 0.852 0.872 0.823 0.705
MALCOM\STYLE 0.986 0.973 0.939 0.875 0.888 0.930 1.000 0.959 0.965 0.880 0.963 0.865
MALCOM 0.981 0.963 0.941 0.911 0.876 0.912 0.966 0.893 0.893 0.888 0.889 0.760
(*) indicates white box attacks. All experiments are averaged across 3 different runs. MALCOM\STYLE: MALCOM without the STYLE module.
Different from all recent attacks, Malcom is an end-to-end
generation framework, and can control the trade-off between
quality and diversity by adjusting the τ parameter accordingly
(Sec. IV-E). Thus, by using a less diverse set of words that are
highly relevant to an article, Malcom can focus on generating
comments with both high quality and coherency. The STYLE
module significantly improves the writing style and boosts the
relevancy of generated comments. Without the STYLE module,
we observe that a model trained with only the ATTACK module
will quickly trade in writing style for attack performance,
and eventually become stuck in mode-collapse, i.e., when the
model outputs only a few words repeatedly. We also observe
that the STYLE module helps strike a balance between topic
coherency and attack performance.
C. AQ2. Attack Performance
In this section, we evaluate Atk% of all attack methods
under the most optimistic scenario where the target article is
just published and contains no comments. We will evaluate
their attack robustness under other scenarios in later sections.
1) White Box Attack: We experiment a white box attack
with fRNN target classifier. RNN architecture is selected as
the white box attack due to its prevalent adoption in various
fake news and rumors detection models. Table V describes
white box attack in the first column of each dataset. We
can observe that Malcom is very effective at attacking white
box models (98% Atk% and 97% Atk% in GOSSIPCOP
and PHEME dataset). Especially, MALCOM\STYLE is able to
achieve near perfect Atk% scores. Comparable to Malcom
are UNITRIGGER and TEXTBUGGER. While other attacks
such as TEXTBUGGER only performs well in one dataset,
Malcom and UNITRIGGER perform consistently across the
two datasets with a very diverse writing styles. This is thanks
to the “learning” process that helps them to generate malicious
comments from not only a single but a set of training instances.
On the contrary, TEXTBUGGER for example, only exploits
a specific pre-defined weakness of the target classifier (e.g.
the vulnerability where misspellings are usually encoded as
unknown tokens [20]) and requires no further learning.
2) Black Box Attack: Let’s use a surrogate fRNN model
as a proxy target classifier to generate malicious comments
to attack black box models. We test their transferability to
black box attacks to five unseen fake news classifiers described
in Sec. V-A3. Table V shows that comments generated by
MALCOM does not only perform well on white box but also
on black box attacks, achieving the best transferability across
all types of black box models. Our method is especially able
Fig. 3: Attack Robust Fake News Detector. Top: GOSSIPCOP
Dataset. Bottom: PHEME Dataset
to attack well-known models such as CSI\t and dEFEND
with an average of 91% and 85% of Atk% in GOSSIPCOP
and PHEME dataset. However, other strong white box attacks
such as UNITRIGGER, TEXTBUGGER and HOTFLIP witness
a significant drop in Atk% with black box target classifiers.
Particularly, UNITRIGGER experiences the worst transferabil-
ity, with its Atk% drops from an average of 94% to merely
over 77% across all models in both datasets. On the other hand,
Malcom performs as much as 90% Atk% across all black box
evaluations. This shows that our method generalizes well not
only on fake news detector trained with different set of inputs
(e.g., with or without title), but also with different modeling
variants (e.g., with or without modeling dependency among
comments) and architectures (RNN, CNN, Attention).
D. AQ3. Attack Robust Fake News Detection
This section evaluates attack performance of all methods
under a post training defense. This defense comes after the
target classifier has already been trained. Before prediction,
we use a robust word recognizer called SCRNN6 [23] to
measure the number of misspellings and detect manipulations
in the comments. We also use the Coherency (Sec. V-A5)
to measure the topic relevancy and set a topic coherency
threshold between comments and the target article to filter-
out irrelevant comments. We remove any comment that either
has more than one suspicious word or have Coherency lower
than that of the article’s title with an allowance margin of 0.05.
This defense system is selected because it does not make any
assumption on any specific attack methods, hence it is both
6https://github.com/danishpruthi/Adversarial-Misspellings
Fig. 4: Robustness of Inter-Attacks: White Box Setting on GOSSIPCOP Dataset
Fig. 5: Robustness of Intra-Attacks: White Box Setting (First
Row) & Black Box (Second-Row) on GOSSIPCOP Dataset.
general and practical. We measure both Atk% and the filter-
out rate, i.e., the percentage of comments that are removed by
the defense system, for all of the attack methods.
Figure 3 shows that our method achieves the best Atk%
even under a rigorous defense in both datasets. While Atk%
of HOTFLIP and TEXTBUGGER drop significantly (around
↓66% and ↓68%) under the defense, that of MALCOM\STYLE
decreases to only 0.64% from a nearly perfect Atk%. This
confirms that the STYLE module is crucial for generating
stealthy comments. Figure 3 also shows that Malcom is the
best to bypass the defense system, achieving better, i.e., lower,
filter-out rate in terms of misspellings compared with real
comments retrieved by COPYCAT method. This is because
Malcom emphasizes writing quality over diversity to be more
stealthy under a robust defense algorithm. Moreover, around
1/3 of real comments selected by COPYCAT are filtered-out by
SCRNN. This confirms that real comments written on social
media are messy and not always free from grammatical errors.
E. AQ4. Robustness
There is always a trade-off between the # of comments
collected for prediction and how early to detect fake news. This
section evaluates Atk% w.r.t different # of existing comments
for early fake news detection. We evaluate on GOSSIPCOP
dataset as an example. We assume that the target classifier
only has access to a few existing comments, a maximum of
20 in this case. First, we define the attack ratio as the ratio of
# of malicious comments over # of existing comments. Next,
we evaluate the robustness among all attack methods in two
categories, namely Inter- and Intra-Comparison.
TABLE VI: Results of User-Study on Generation Quality
Hypothesis z-score p-value Accuracy #response
H1 1.4940 0.0676 0.6087 46
H2 1.2189 0.1114 0.5818 56
H3 0.9122 0.1808 0.5416 120
Inter-Comparison: How attack methods perform differently
with the same attack ratio? Figure 4 shows that Malcom
outperforms other baselines under all attack ratios. Moreover,
our method consistently maintains Atk% of at least 80% under
a different # of existing comments with an attack ratio as low
as 40%. On the contrary, to achieve the same performance,
UNITRIGGER, the second-best attack in terms of robustness,
would require a 100% attack ratio. Intra-Comparison: For
each method, how many malicious comments are needed for
an effective attack performance under different # of existing
comments? Figure 5 shows the results on white box and
black box attacks. Under the white box attack, all methods
display more or less the same performance with more than 1
malicious comment. However, the black box setting observes
more variance across different attack ratios. Specifically, Mal-
com’s performance continuously improves as the # of existing
comments increases under any attack ratios ≥ 40%. On the
contrary, existing attacks show little improvement even with
an increasing # of malicious comments.
VI. DISCUSSION
A. Prevent Malicious Comments with Human Support
We examine whether malicious comments generated by
MALCOM can be easily flagged by human, i.e., the Turing
Test. We use Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) to recruit over
100 users to distinguish comments generated by MALCOM
(machine-generated) and human. We examine the following
alternative hypothesises using one-tailed statistical testing.
1) H1: Given a comment, the users can correctly detect if the
comment is generated by machine (not by human).
2) H2: Given a comment, the users can correctly detect if the
comment is generated by human (not by machine).
3) H3: Given a machine-generated and a human-written
comment, the users can correctly identify the machine-
generated.
For quality assurance, we recruit only the users with 95%
approval rate, randomly swap the choices and discard re-
sponses taking less than 30 seconds. We test on comments
generated for 187 unseen and unique articles in the PHEME
dataset’s test set. Table VI shows that we fail to reject the
null-hypothesises of both H1,H2 and H3 (p-value > 0.05).
While comments generated by MALCOM is not perfectly
stealthy (accuracy of H1 > 0.5), it is still very challenging to
distinguish between human-written and MALCOM-generated
comments. In fact, human-written comments on social media
are usually messy, which lead users to be unable to distinguish
between machine-generated ones (accuracy of H2 < 0.6).
Thus, even if human are employed to filter out suspicious
or auto-generated comments with a mean accuracy of 60%
(H1), MALCOM can still effectively achieve over 80% Atk%
on average with a remaining 40% of the malicious comments
(see Sec. V-E). Hence, we need to equip human workers
with intensive training to better identify malicious comments.
Nevertheless, this can be labor intensive and costly due to a
large amount of comments published everyday.
B. Prevent Malicious Comments with Machine Support
One advantage of the defense system introduced in Sec.
V-D is that filtering out comments based on misspellings and
topic coherency does not make any assumption on any specific
attack methods, hence it is both general and practical. In
the most optimistic scenario where we expects only attacks
from MALCOM, we can train a ML model to detect MAL-
COM-generated comments. We use LIWC [22] dictionary to
extract 91 psycholinguistics features and use them to train
a Random Forest classifier to differentiate between human-
written, i.e., COPYCAT, and MALCOM-generated comments
based on their linguistic patterns. The 5-fold cross-validation
accuracy is 0.68(+/−0.1), which means around 70% and 30%
of MALCOM-generated and human-written comments will be
flagged and removed by the classifier. From Figure 5, if the
initial attack ratio of 100%, one can then effectively put an
upper-bound of around 80% Atk% rate on MALCOM (new
attack ratio of 40%).
Other ways to defend against Malcom is to only allow
users with verified identifications to publish or engage in
discussion threads, or to utilize a fake account detection system
(e.g., [35]) to weed out suspicious user accounts. We can
also exercise adversarial learning [9] and train a target fake
news classifier together with malicious comments generated
by potential attack methods. Social platforms should also
develop their own proprietary fake news training dataset and
rely less on public datasets or fact-checking resources such
as GossipCop and PolitiFact. While this may adversely limit
the pool of training instances, it will help raise the bar for
potential attacks.
C. Real News Demotion Attack
An attacker can be paid to either promote fake news or
demote real news. By demoting real news, in particular, not
only can the attacker cause great distrust among communities,
but the attacker can also undermine the credibility of news
organizations and public figures who publish and share the
news. In fact, Malcom can also facilitate such an attack, i.e.,
to fool fake news detectors to classify real news as fake news,
by simply specifying the target label L∗ ←− 1 (Sec. IV-C).
Our experiments show that Malcom can achieve a real news
demotion white box attack with Atk% of around 92% and
TABLE VII: Ablation Test
Models GOSSIPCOP Dataset↑Quality ↓Diversity ↑Coherency ↑Atk%
\STYLE\ATTACK 0.645 1.664 0.727 0.392
\ATTACK 0.741 2.032 0.769 0.434
\STYLE 0.740 2.639 0.659 0.986
MALCOM 0.759 2.520 0.730 0.981
Models PHEME Dataset↑Quality ↓Diversity ↑Coherency ↑Atk%
\STYLE\ATTACK 0.759 1.273 0.845 0.519
\ATTACK 0.741 0.786 1.431 0.850
\STYLE 0.517 2.399 0.732 1.000
MALCOM 0.776 1.917 0.812 0.966
\STYLE, \ATTACK: MALCOM with the STYLE, ATTACK module removed.
95% in GOSSIPCOP and PHEME datasets. Figure 1 shows an
example of a real news demotion attack. The real news article
was posted by The Guardian, a reputable news source, on
Twitter on June 4, 2018. The article is first correctly predicted
as real news by a RNN-based fake news classifier. However,
the attacker can post a malicious yet realistic-looking comment
“he’s a conservative from a few months ago” to successfully
fool the classifier to predict the article as fake instead.
D. Ablation Test
This section carries out ablation test to show the effec-
tiveness of STYLE and ATTACK component of Malcom.
Specifically, we valuate the quality, diversity, coherency and
as well as white box attack performance of different variants
of Malcom. Figure VII demonstrates that STYLE module en-
hances the writing quality and coherency by large margin from
the model without STYLE module. Especially, STYLE module
is crucial in improving topic coherency score, which then
makes generated comments more stealthy under robust fake
news defense system (Sec. V-D). Figure VII also shows that
ATTACK module is critical in improving attack performance.
While STYLE and ATTACK each trades off quality, coherency
with attack success rate and vice versa, the full Malcom
achieves a balanced performance between a good writing style
and high attack success. This makes our framework both
powerful and practical.
E. Baselines’ Dependency on COPYCAT
Compared to Malcom, one disadvantage of HOTFLIP,
UNITRIGGER and TEXTBUGGER is that they all require an
initial comment to manipulate. In theory, manually crafting
an initial comment is feasible, yet demands a great labor
cost. In practice, an attacker can directly use the target’s title
or an existing comment as the initial comment to begin the
attack. Instead, in this paper, we use COPYCAT to retrieve the
initial comment. COPYCAT considers both the topic of the
target article and the target label into consideration. Hence, it
can help complement other baseline attacks in terms of both
Atk% and topic coherency. Our experiments show that attacks
using comments retrieved by COPYCAT achieve much better
averaged Atk% across both white box and black box attacks
(89% Atk%), compared to the ones using the title (75% Atk%)
or a single existing comment (78% Atk%) of the target article.
This further justifies the use of COPYCAT together with other
baseline attacks in our experiments.
VII. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we assume that the attacker and the model
provider share the same training dataset. In practice, their
training datasets might be overlapped but not exactly the
same. Moreover, whether or not comments generated using
one sub-domain (e.g., political fake news) can be transferable
to another (e.g., health fake news) is also out of scope of this
paper. Hence, we leave the investigation on the proposed at-
tack’s transferability across different datasets for future work.
Moreover, we also plan to extend our method to attack graph-
based fake news detectors (e.g., [24]), and evaluate our model
with other defense mechanisms such as adversarial learning,
i.e., to train the target fake news classifier with both real
and malicious comments to make it more robust. We also
want to exploit similar attack strategy in areas that utilize
sequential dependency among text using ML such as fake
reviews detection.
VIII. CONCLUSION
To our best knowledge, this paper is the first attempt
to attack existing neural fake news detectors via malicious
comments. Our method does not require adversaries to have
an ownership over the target article, hence becomes a practical
attack. We also introduce Malcom, an end-to-end malicious
comments generation framework that can generate realistic and
relevant adversarial comments to fool five of most popular
neural fake news detectors to predict fake news as real news
with attack success rates of 94% and 90% for a white box
and black box settings. Not only achieving significantly better
attack performances than other baselines, Malcom is shown
to be more robust even under the condition when a rigorous
defense system works against malicious comments. We also
show that Malcom is capable of not only promoting fake
news but also demoting real news. Due to the high-stakes of
detecting fake news in practice, in future, we hope that this
work will attract more attention from the community towards
developing fake news detection models that are accurate yet
resilient against potential attacks.
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